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The shift to neoliberalism is rarely narrated from the
vantage point of the household, but it is here – in the
realm of unpaid bills and mounting laundry – that
the contradictions of our political moment are felt
most forcefully, writes Laura Briggs. Her US-focused
book, How All Politics Became Reproductive Politics,
retells the story of neoliberal economics ‘from inside
families’ and reframes its legacy through the lens of
the care crisis. How did it get so hard, Briggs asks,
to find the time and resources to do the necessary
work of reproduction? The institutionalisation of the
‘double day’–the site of one of feminism’s great unfin-
ished battles – has, she observes, eroded Americans’
collective capacity to have and raise children, care
for the elderly and support the sick and disabled. In
Briggs’ account, the neoliberal economic reforms of
the 1980s and 1990s curtailed the dissenting energies
of twentieth-century radical protest movements: this
is the historical moment at which ‘all politics became
reproductive politics’. It is a controversial headline
claim: after all, has there ever been a time under cap-
italism when ‘all politics’ were not shot through with
the contradictions of social reproduction? The book
never fully confronts this question, though it does
paint a dynamic portrait of the structural contradic-
tions that attend the contemporary organisation of
care work in America.
Of course, to merely acknowledge the existence
of a contemporary ‘care crisis’ is neither new nor ne-
cessarily radical. Briggs knows this: it is why she
gives space in the first chapter to Gavin McInnes, the
far-right founder of Vice Media, who told a Fox News
host in 2015: ‘Feminism has made women miserable.
Women were much happier when housewives were
glorified.’ McInnes’ comment epitomises a historic-
ally illiterate right-wing narrative that blames femin-
ism for the withdrawal of social support for domestic
work. In fact, Briggs contends, feminists were cent-
ral to a broad field of twentieth-century left-wing
struggles around social reproduction, from the labour
movement fight for an eight-hour working day to the
wages for housework campaigns and the Black Pan-
thers’ free breakfast programmes. The book’s focus
on the ‘deep, and intimate links – including failure
and betrayal, but also support [and] solidarity’ across
feminist, labour and racial justice movements is a
powerful rejoinder to those who would reduce these
movements to insipid calls for diverse boardrooms.
It is the truncation of such twentieth-century re-
productive labour struggles that has brought us to
the current precipice: a contemporary order in which
it is ‘impossible for any member of a household to
stay home and do reproductive labour, much less do
paid work and still have the time, space, and resources
to care for dependents, households, and communit-
ies’. This situation is new only in its generalisation to
the whole population. Black women in America have
been denied the rights, time or resources to mother
their children since the era of enslavement, when, as
Hortense Spillers states in her essay ‘Mama’s Baby,
Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book’ (1987),
‘the female could not, in fact, claim her child’. One
of the most compelling threads of Briggs’ book re-
veals how racism continues to function as a sticking
plaster and alibi for the deficiencies of privatised care.
Drawing on the work of Wahneema Lubiano, Briggs
explores the construction of the ‘welfare queen’ ste-
reotype as a ‘cover story for reducing government
programs in general’: in short, teenage mothers were
scapegoated so welfare could be gutted. The racist
myth-making of the 1990s provided lessons for the
financial crash of 2008, when banks courted Black,
Latinx and female-headed households for subprime
mortgages, then retrospectively smeared them as ir-
responsible borrowers who caused the recession.
If welfare reform rode the coat-tails of racist fear-
mongering about so-called ‘cultures of poverty’, it
did so in order to construct new moral imperatives
aroundwork in an era of wage stagnation. In the wake
of these shifts, US immigration policy has overseen
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a process of ‘offshoring’ reproductive labour. Briggs
saliently points out that the management of migra-
tion to the US is ‘significantly a question about how
household and child care work are getting done in the
aftermath of the neoliberal push to get all mothers
and other caregivers into the workforce for 40 and
more hours a week’. Almost a million women mi-
grants in the US, many of them undocumented, are
employed as domestic workers and vulnerable to low
wages, abuse by employers and chronic health prob-
lems. Joining the dots between anti-union laws, wage
cuts and immigration control, Briggs shows that it is
through racism that the system – barely – sustains
itself.
New forms of what the book terms ‘structural in-
fertility’ have developed along racialised lines too.
Black infant andmaternal mortality is roughly double
the white rate – a disparity thought to endure across
social classes, whether because of racism within the
healthcare system or the toll of the everyday experi-
ence of being black in America. Briggs juxtaposes this
disparity in mortality rates with the case of Silicon
Valley, where wealthy and often white employees are
urged to freeze their eggs on the company dollar and
devote their fertile years to work. The book treads a
careful line here: acknowledging that funding for and
access to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs)
is ‘precisely eugenic’ in its privileging of a majority
white professional class, Briggs nevertheless main-
tains that black infant mortality and ARTs are two di-
mensions of the same trend: the rise of ‘involuntary,
structural infertility as a result of economic changes
and unsafe jobs’.
The final chapter turns to gay marriage, which
resembles egg freezing as an ostensibly progress-
ive policy that, in Briggs’ analysis, in fact bolsters
the ‘privatisation of dependency’. Twentieth-century
queer politics had imagined and enacted new config-
urations of kinship and community beyond the nuc-
lear family. But by the end of the century, ‘the per-
sistent, growing, and widespread absence of a social
safety net together with active hostility from insti-
tutions like hospitals and schools to recognising gay
kinship meant that, increasingly, family was the only
obvious means for queer folks to care for dependents,
and it needed to be a “legal” family.’ In this telling,
gay marriage expanded access to the nuclear family
in order to further entrench it as the site of privatised
and unremunerated reproductive labour.
Briggs is nostalgic for the radical visions of
twentieth-century protest movements. As she writes,
‘While in many ways the sixties and seventies had
been no better in reality, there had been optimism
and momentum to build public support for care.’ But
the book’s focus on the present moment of reproduct-
ive crisis evades a recognition that the disavowal of
social reproduction has endured as a problem across
all stages of capitalist development – that it is, in fact,
a problem produced by capitalism. As Nancy Fraser
puts it in ‘Crisis of Care?’, her contribution to Tithi
Bhattacharya’s Social Reproduction Theory (2017), ‘the
present crisis of social reproduction indicates some-
thing rotten not only in capitalism’s current, finan-
cialised form but in capitalist society per se.’ This rot,
as Fraser outlines, can be detected in the ‘separate
spheres’ ideology of the nineteenth century and the
social democracy of the mid-twentieth century, as
well as the present stage of financialised capitalism.
Each era has developed a different way of organising
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and naturalising the reproductive labour on which
capital depends. Briggs defines reproductive labour
as ‘the work necessary to the reproduction of human
life’, but it is also, of course, the work necessary to the
reproduction of capital: reproductive labour supplies
new workers and replenishes their energies at the end
of the day, all without commanding a wage. By con-
ceptualising household labour as ‘the reproduction of
things we value’, the book glosses over the tensions
between the imperatives of capital and the desires,
frustrations, projects, imaginaries and pleasures that
stir outside or against those imperatives.
One result of this perspective is a tendency to
flatten out the dissent internal to feminism, soften-
ing the edges of liberal-capitalist, socialist and Marx-
ist feminisms to draw them all into a reformist con-
sensus. The book mounts a surprising defence of
two high-profile commentators on the ‘care crisis’:
Facebook’s Sheryl Sandberg, who notoriously advised
women to combat structurally sexist workplaces by
‘leaning in’ to power, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, the
Obama administration policy director who has pub-
licly criticised the structural barriers she had faced
as a successful woman with children. To Briggs, both
Sandberg and Slaughter have been unfairly maligned
because they are ‘women talking about reproductive
labour’ – but neither commentator has framed her
intervention in these terms, perhaps because doing
so would mean negotiating the antagonism between
work-life balance reforms within capitalism and re-
productive labour struggles against capitalism. While
Briggs recognises the limitations of both women’s re-
commendations for reform, she does not pursue the
deeper implications of this antagonism.
A similar flattening takes place in the book’s dis-
cussion of the wages for housework movement, which
finds its revolutionary horizon reduced to a demand
for a ‘40-hour workweek that enables people to get
paid and still have time to do essential care work’.
This description fails to capture the autonomist cri-
tique of work that drove the campaign. Wages for
housework was also wages against housework, as
Silvia Federici affirmed when she wrote: ‘To say that
we want money for housework is the first step to-
wards refusing to do it, because the demand for awage
makes our work visible, which is the most indispens-
able condition to begin to struggle against it, both
in its immediate aspect as housework and its more
insidious character as femininity’ (‘Wages Against
Housework’, 1975). At its most radical moments, the
campaign called not for more time to do housework,
but for its abolition. The demand for wages, as ant-
agonistic to the state as to the private home, was the
impossible claim that would fracture the whole or-
der of things. In her book The Problem With Work
(2011), Kathi Weeks draws a parallel between wages
for housework and contemporary movements for uni-
versal basic income (UBI). Like the demand for wages
for housework, UBI has its reformist and its revolu-
tionary modes, but in its strongest form it would de-
tach the means to live and thrive from the system
of waged work. Set against current debates around
UBI, Briggs’ closing list of ‘things that would help’ –
including a 40-hour workweek and school schedules
to match – is striking for its timidity in the face of the
crisis she has so cogently diagnosed.
The concept of wages against housework is valu-
able because it sutures a framework for resisting
pronatalism to a critique of the devaluation of ma-
ternal labour. In ‘Women and the Subversion of the
Community’, Selma James and Mariarosa Dalla Costa
targeted the way ‘women have been forced to have
children and were forbidden the right to have abor-
tions when, as was to be expected, the most prim-
itive techniques of birth control failed.’ Briggs, by
comparison, tends to pit campaigns around abortion
and contraception against struggles for the rights and
resources to parent. She writes that ‘we have been
debating abortion, birth control, and the means of
preventing unwanted pregnancies vigorously and at
length for two generations, but while we were look-
ing there, many people lost the ability to have the
children they wanted’. It is certainly true that re-
productive rights activism has often been narrowly
focused on abortion and contraception rights, which
are too readily conceived in abstract legal terms and
divorced from material circumstances. At the same
time, the rights and access to abortion and contra-
ception are extremely limited in the US and around
the world – this is hardly a battle that has been won.
Commenting on the conservative rollback of the wel-
fare state and the removal of workplace protections
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for pregnant women, Briggs writes, ‘This was the real
war on women’. The comment not only risks down-
playing the Trump administration’s renewed attack
on the minimal freedoms secured by Roe v. Wade: it
also misses an opportunity to show how pronatalism
and anti-natalism reinforce each other. The task of a
materialist feminism is, surely, to conceive of repro-
ductive freedom as an expanded field in which child-
rearing is chosen, not enforced; shared and resourced,
not privatised; refused by some, taken up by others,
and detached from gender roles, racist coercion and
moralising imperatives.
HowAll Politics Became Reproductive Politics offers
a valuable description of the social reproductive con-
tradictions of the present state of things, and rightly
emphasises the tightly bound relation of racism and
reproductive politics. Briggs’ conception of the scope
of change is, however, disappointingly narrow, espe-
cially compared to some of the historical movements
it invokes. The book’s closing pages note that ‘even
major corporations have long since realised that eas-
ing work/life burdens improves productivity’. In light
of the immiserating social conditions sketched in this
book, it is surely time to question whether the drive
to improve productivity will ever be compatible with
the movement for reproductive freedom.
Sophie Jones
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In his most recent book, apparently meant for a
general audience and made up of essays previ-
ously appearing in non-scholarly publications, Ga-
len Strawson has provided a nice recap of his gen-
eral philosophical position. Most importantly, he has
provided an opportunity to assess the relationship
between philosophical discourse and what we might
call common sense or everyday concepts. Strawson
exactly captures the aporias and contradictions that
are inherent, if often unnoticed, in the concepts with
which we ordinarily operate in our everyday lives.
However, I will also argue that we must treat these
aporias and contradictions not as proven truths about
reality, but as indications ofwhere our common-sense
understanding is in error. If we fail to notice these er-
rors, as Strawson does, we are inevitably led to accept
a certain amount of magical thinking and, more prob-
lematically, be convinced that we have no capacity to
alter our lives, or the world, for the better.
Strawson is probably best known for his argument
against free will, and so against the possibility of
moral responsibility. In the introduction to Things
That Bother Me, Strawson notes the angry response he
has gotten to this argument over the years from those
unable to refute it: ‘The virulence of the messages
suggests that those who send them think that the ar-
gument is sound, and this makes their anger a little
odd… after all, they hold the same view themselves’.
Strawson’s rhetoric leads inexorably to conclusions
most find troubling. However, few are able to inter-
rogate the premises on which they are based, because
they are premises on which almost everyone operates
in everyday life. The point is that once we have accep-
ted Strawson’s use of our own everyday conceptions
of free will, consciousness and determinism, then
his conclusions are irrefutable. We must then accept
the absence of all agency, the concept of the mind
as a passive observer, and, most absurdly of all, pan-
psychism. However, if it is possible to examine these
premises, so it is also possible to demonstrate the
very different possibilities for human life that are re-
vealed once we have corrected, or at least questioned,
these assumptions.
In this collection, the concept of free will – the
basis of Strawson’s most troubling and best known ar-
guments – is most explicitly addressed in two essays:
‘Luck Swallows Everything’ and ‘You Cannot Make
Yourself the Way You Are’. I take it that Strawson’s
idea of free will in these essays is precisely the one
most people do indeed ordinarily operate under. Put
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